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ABSTRACf 
This paper discusses the use of uncertain knowledge in eipert systems. The 
discussion is focused on the use of these systems to support decision making 
in complei, uncertain environments. Within this conteit, our research 
indicates that strictly probabilistic representations, which enable the use or 
decision-theoretic reasoning, are highly preferable to recently proposed 
alternatives. Furthermore, the language of influence diagrams and a 
corresponding methodology that allows decision theory to be used 
effectively and efficiently as a decision-making aid is discussed. A sy�tem, 
called RACHEL, that helps infertile couples select pertinent medical 
treatments provides an illustration of this methodology. 
I. INTRODUCTION: MAKING DIFFICULT DECISIONS 
Reasoning about uncertain knowledge is fundamentally a question of 
developing and manipulating a measure of our information about various 
possible worlds. We consider reasoning about uncertainty in the context of 
decision making, i.e. when there is an explicit intention to irrevocably 
allocate valuable resources. This contrasts with a situation where one is 
"curious" about the world, or wishes to eitract patterns or frequencies from 
a large body of information with no direct intention to make a decision. 
Consider a situation where the decision maker is unable to select a clear 
course of action. This inability is most often indicative of the absence of a 
satisfactory representation (model) of the decision, or of an acceptable 
method for reasoning with this representation to yield a recommendation for 
action. In particular, the followina situations are often associated with 








































• Dissatisfaction witb Available Alternatives 
The decision maker feels that there must be other choices 
beyond those being considered. 
• Lack of Oarity 
One or more elements of the decision model are ambiguously 
defined. 
• Inadequate Structural Understanding 
The relationships and dependencies among the variables in the 
decision model are not clearly represented. 
• Inferential Complexity 
The decision context requires a major inferential effort to deduce 
the effect of actions on outcomes. 
• Combinatorial Complexity 
The number of possibHities being considered is overwhelmingly large. 
• Inability to Deal with Uncertainty 
Lack of a satisfactory means for representing, measuring, and 
reasoning with information about the possible outcomes of 
decision factors. 
In light of these common obstacles in the decision-making process, an 
individual facing a difficult decision often needs assistance in four areas. 
• Generating Alternatjves 
That is, developing possible courses of action. 
• Constructing a WeU-defined Decision Model 
That is, identify the factors which impinge on the decision and define 
the relationships between these factors. 
• Focusing Attention tln t.t1e MaJor Issues (jf Ute .oeetsten 
That is, distinguishing what is important to the individual 
decision maker from what is generally relevant to all problems 
within the decision conte:xt. 
• Combining the Available Information into a Decision Recommendation 
That is, reasoning with the decision model to obtain a recommended 
course of action. 
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All but the first of these four needs for decision support is discuseed. 
II. EXPERT SYSTEMS AS DECISION AIDS 
Implicit in the use of computer-based techniques for decision makina. and of 
expert decision support systems in particular, is the contention that the 
effectiveness of decision making can be improved through the use of formal 
analytic techniques. Specifically, systems that provide a recommendation for 
action must have within them one or more formal statements that conclude a 
suggestion for action on the basis of a format representation of the decision. 
We refer to such statements, which can be implicit as well as explicit, as 
"action uioms" (Holtzman, 198�1. 
An essential requirement for successful decision support systems is that 
they be based on an action uioni which is explicit and can be clearly 
presented to the decision maker for approval. Ultimately. the value or the 
system's recommendations hinge on the extent to which the decision mater 
trusts the system's reasoning paradigm. The choice of an underlying 
normative axiomatic system can have a profound effect on the usefulness of 
an expert decision support system. 
An evaluation of the available representations for uncertain knowledge from 
a decision perspective reveals the desirability or strict probabilistic forms. 
Beyond the classic works of Savage [ 1972) and de Finetti [ 1968). who araue 
eloquently for the formalism or decision theory as a basis for normative 
reasoning, Lindley [ 1982) has shown that, under very weak assumptions, 
non-probabilistic representations of uncertainty (including fuzzy sets [Zadeh, 
1981 J and Dempster-Shafer evidence measures (Shafer, J 976).) are 
theoretically inadmissible. In this context, inadmissibility refers to the 
existence of legitimate situations where the decision mater would be given a 
recommendation to act in a way that would dea-ease his or her welfare for 
certain. 
In addition to its admissibility, there is a more pragmatic argument for 
basing expert decision support systems on a decision-theoretic action axiom, 
that is, on the maximization of expected utility. Bitensive experience in the 
professional practice of decision analysis provides a mature and well-tested 
methodology for the formulation, assessment, and use of decision-theoretic 
models. Effective techniques exist for the development of individual 
decision models and for the assessment or the values of model parameters. 
These techniques are well understood and can be almost directly 








































counterpart to this metbodoJogy exists for non-probabilistic representations 
of uncertainty. 
Designing an expert decision support system on tbe basis of a decision­
theoretic representation directly addresses the need of decision makers to 
construct a well- defined decision model. Furthermore, decision theory 
provides a powerful means for combining the available information into a 
decision recommendatjon. 
Of course, although it surely helps, a good wrench does not necessarily make 
a good plumber. Similarly, a good repn:m;mtat.ion language paves the way to 
good representations, but doe:! not guarantee them. Beyond its language, 
much of the value of the methodology of decision analysis lies in the way in 
which it facilitates tbe formalization of a real decision into a model 
HI. DEVELOPING REPRESENTATIONS OF SPECIFIC DECISIONS 
A fundamental feature of decision analysis as a normative methodology is a 
recognition of the fac.i that the most common maior stumbling block in 
making a decision lies not in solving an existing decision model but in 
formulating such a model. A useful way to visualize the decision analytic 
process from this perspective is as an interactive three-stage process 
illustrated on the followjng page. Foreshadowing some of our later 
discussion. we note that the stages of this process have a direct 
correspondence with three major functions of an expert system: theory 
formation, inference, and e1planation. The three stages of the decision 
analysis process can be described as follows. 
1. Formalizing the decision, that is, building a formaJ .modeJ of a 
real decision situation-- theory formation --, 
2. Solving the decision mode.l, that is, applying a set of formaJ 
axioms to the decision model to deduce its impJicit 
recommendation ---inference --,and 
3. Clarifying the decisi<J:n recommendation, that is, interpreting 
the model solution in terms of its implications as a guide for 
real action a•- explanation. 
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SOLVE CLARIFY 
A thrEe-stage decision process 
To be useful. a decision methodology must help the decision maker identify 
the most significant features of his decision situation. It is much more 
common for a decision to be difficult because too much is being considered 
than because too few issues have been raised. One could argue that this 
prevalence of overly complex models is evidence that many of our decision­
making habits are a legacy of a time when information, rather than 
attention , was scarce. In any case, it is simple to show that people are 
excellent at listing issues that are relevant to just about any decision, often 
in spite of their lack of direct familiarity with the decision context. In 
contrast, even the most experienced among us is demonstrably quite inept at 
identifying which of those relevant issues are important to a particular 
decision maker. 
Much of the weight of the foregoing argument lies on the meaning we give to 
the terms "significant", and "important". In this discussion, these terms are 
essentially equivalent. and refer to the degree to which a feature in the 
decision model affects the decision mater's welfare and choices. As an 
illustration, suppose you are considering the purchase of an automobile. 
Assume that you are concerned about fuel efficiency and that you do not 
particularly care to do your own repairs. In this case, although both are 
relevant toyour decision, the standard mileage ratings of the cars you are 
considering are likely to be important, whereas the fact that a car is 
designed using English or metric measurements is probably unimportant. A 
model of your decision has a better chance of being useful to you if it plainly 
ignores the whole issue of engine dimensions and concentrates on what you 








































Therefore, in designing decision models one must be guided by the decision 
mater's preferences to be able to distinguish and focus attention on what is 
important, rather than on all that is relevant. A fundamental flaw in most 
designs for expert decision support systems is the reliance on decision 
models which have been built without a clear decision context. In particular, 
these a-priori models fail to account for the decision maker's preferences. 
Although valid for strictly descriptive systems and situations with very clear 
dominating solutions, such models have little general normative power. 
Central to this b uiJding process is the use of sensitivity analysis calculations 
(of various sorts) as a means of focusing attention, i.e. directing search. 
Sensitivity analysis should be an integral part of the model-building effort-­
guiding it to what is most important to the decision maker -- and not just an 
afterthought to check the validity of numerical parametric assessments. 
IV. EXPERT SYSTEMS FOR DECISION ANALYSIS 
Decision-analytic reasoning can be incorporated into the reasoning process of 
an expert system in a relatively straightforward way. A useful tool for this 
purpose is the language of influence diagrams [Howard and Matheson, 1981). 
Influence diagrams (IDs) are a generalization of decision trees and have been 
empirically shown to have considerable intuitive appeal for wide classes of 
decision makers. In addition, they are a powerful communication tool for the 
participants in the decision process. 
Influence diagrams are acyclic, directed graphs representing the 
probabilistic, logical, and informational relationships between variables in a 
decision model. Nodes in the graph can represent the decision-maker's 
decision alternatives, uncertain variables in the decision domain, and the· 
decision maker's preferences with respect to the model variables. An arc 
leading to a node representing a decison variable indicates the value of the 
preceding node is known at the time that the decision will be made. Presence 
of an arc between nodes representing uncertain variables indicates that the 
two variables may be probabiHsticaUy dependent. 
A full description of IDs, their use as a decision modeling language, and their 
solution are beyond the scope of this paper. Relevant discussions can. be 
found in tbe literature (Howard and Matheson, 1984; Olmsted, 1983; 
Shachter, 1984; Holtzman, 198S). However, it is important to note that, by 
construction, IDs are mathematically well-defined and can be directly used 
in decision-theoretic calculations (Breese and Holtzman. 1984; Shachter, 
1984). 
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Recent research indicates that the formalism of influence diagrams is an 
effective means for representing decision knowledge in expert systems 
[Holtzman, 19851. Decision knowledge can be encoded as a collection of 
portions of influence diagrams. This is used to develop an overall decision 
model as a side effect of the inferential process of an expert system and be 
solved for the optimal solution in the same formalism. This form of 
knowledge can guide the decision-making process and, in particular, it can 
focus the task of formulating a decision model effectively and efficiently. An 
important feature of this representation of uncertain knowledge is that it 
does not have the tremendous requirements of data commonly associated 
with a-priori probabilistic models. Furthermore, it does not impose artificial 
independence constraints on the data it uses. 
V. RACHEL: A PILOT-LEVEL EXPERT DECISION ANALYST 
An experimental expert decision system has been built as an application of 
the methodology discussed in this paper [Holtzman, 19851. The system, 
called RACHEL, is designed to help infertile couples select a medical course of 
action. RACHEL concentrates on the initial formulation of a model of the 
patient's decision. The resulting model is then solved to yield a decision 
recommendation. The user is finally left in an interactive environment 
where he or she can analyze, modify, and resolve the model as needed. 
A typical consultation with RACHEL can be divided into three phases. The 
first consists of the assessment of a deterministic model of patient 
preferences. This model is obtained by first selecting one of several 
available model schemas on the basis the presence or absence of major 
decision features and then instantiating the model schema with patient 
specific information. The second phase develops a probabilistic distribution 
for the outcome of this preference model given each and every possible 
decision alternative under consideration. This distribution is almost 
invariably obtained by constructing a fully assessed patient-specific 
influence diagram. The third phase of a consultation includes the solution of 
the initial model developed in the first two phases and concludes by placing 
the user in an interactive mode, where he or she can refine the decision 
model. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Decision analytic techniques are powerful tools for the design of expert 
systems for decision support in complex, uncertain domains. Such systems 
should make explicit use of the decision maker's preferences to focus 








































uncertain knowledge probabillstically to ensure the admissibility of their 
recommendations. A probabilistic representation or uncertainty provides a 
normative means for making inferences in support of decision making, and 
influence diagrams provide a natural, computable device for building and 
manipulating models. 
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